Marouane Chamakh: His playing style analysed in detail – Bordeaux and Arsenal Scouting
Having discussed the tactical possibilities available to Arsene Wenger with new signing Marouane Chamakh, it seems appropriate to follow up with a more detailed study of the way Chamakh actually plays, based on matches he played for Bordeaux in 2009-10.
Under Laurent Blanc Bordeaux used a clear 4-2-3-1 formation, relying on attacks from the wings, with Gourcuff running the centre of midfield. The team played good football, building possession from the back, and attacking with three creative players and Chamakh. Their formation is visible in this screenshot of the Lyon vs. Bordeaux Champions League Quarter Final first leg in 2010. The fullbacks are marked orange, the holding midfield yellow, attacking midfielders in blue, and Chamakh as striker in pink.
Chamakh played a crucial role for Bordeaux, leading the line and scoring goals, a constant threat to defenders. His style does not involve running with the ball or outpacing opposing defenders, but rather linking up with midfielders, and holding up the ball, in the ‘false nine’, and converting crosses in the box.
Movement
Good movement is a crucial feature of his game. When in possession he looks to drop deep in order to receive the ball and pass. In this scenario he almost always lays the ball off to midfield before and making a forward run, similar in style to Van Persie. In this way he can hold play up whilst support from the three creative midfielders gets forward up the pitch.
This style of dropping deep to support the midfield also made use of Chamakh’s powerful heading ability. This was utilised by Bordeaux from goal kicks, here he actually moves deeper than the three attacking midfielders, attempting the flick on, and then running forward into space.
In image 1. he drops back (pink) to head a goal kick, actually between the lines of the central midfielders (yellow) and attacking midfielders (blue).
Image 2. shows the resulting attack, with Chamakh (pink) running into the space he has created, meanwhile the attacking midfielders pushing forward have effectively created a 4 vs. 4 situation, whilst the Lyon right back is now stuck marking the left midfielder. This allows space between opposition fullback and centre back which Chamakh always looks to exploit.
A noticeable trait is his desire to play behind the shoulder of the last centre back, switching as the ball switches sides, which means that the defenders never have an easy time tracking him, his exploitation of the space between the centre back and fullback is especially effective when the opposition fullbacks are pinned down by the wide players in a 4-2-3-1 formation. Indeed he popped up behind the last centre back to score against Lyon in the Champions League Quarter Final first leg.
As a single striker he interchanges well with the attacking midfield, creating space, making runs and pressurising within the opponents half. Another feature of his play is to move wide to the wings, looking to create space in the centre for forward runs from midfield.
In the Lyon match Chamakh’s movement across the defence was clear, and this time allowed him to exploit the gap next to the other Lyon centre back. Indeed in this situation the opposite fullback (orange) is outnumbered two to one by Bordeaux midfielders (blue), and Chamakh is able to create space around him whilst Michel Bastos, the Lyon left back is still up field.
His runs across the defence to create space were also demonstrated during Bordeaux’s 1-0 win over Montpelier in December 2009. Chamakh (pink) is running across the Montpelier back line, taking the adjacent centre back with him. This opens up space infront of the Montpelier goal where central midfielders will not be closed down as quickly (blue box), and additionally provides an option for the fullback (blue) to pass to Chamakh out wide.
Alternatively Chamakh remains on the shoulder of the last defender looking for a lofted pass or through ball. This also means that the central defence are occupied and as noted in several matches, his constant movement across the defence means that they must stay alert to pick him up.
Without possession Bordeaux used Chamakh as the front line of defence when without possession, whereby he pressured within the opponents half, chasing down defenders, but remaining forward of the halfway line.
One of Bordeaux’s main avenues of attack seems to have been spreading play to the wings, and putting in crosses for Chamakh to score from. The striker gets into the box early and will usually challenge for headers, leading to his high success rate for headed goals. This approach could be used by Arsenal; the wide players, especially Sagna can provide quality crosses, which Nicklas Bendtner has occasionally used to good effect. If this method of play is developed then new options open up to the Arsenal side.
The transfer of Chamakh could be seen as shrewd business by Wenger, this is a player with proven Champions League quality, and whilst his style does fit with the Arsenal team, he is actually able to combine aspects of the ‘false nine’ with the ‘fox in the box’ that Wenger eulogised about all those years ago. The opportunity to change approaches, and more successfully convert aerial balls into the box will be welcomed by the team, and critics who often point out the club’s lack of plan B.
All of the aspects of Chamakh’s playing style discussed above are represented in the video of his touches against Juventus in the Champions League 09/10, remember the points about movement and dropping deep and it seems very clear.
Marouane Chamakh could essentially pose Arsene Wenger a selection problem this season if Arsenal stick to their current tactical set up, but ultimately he provides excellent cover for a team which has been stretched far too often over the previous few years.
In 2009 – 10 Arsenal played with what was widely regarded as a 4-3-3, but in effect was a fluid 4-2-3-1 formation. This consisted of two central midfielders holding the centre of the park, whilst Fabregas played between the lines. Two wide players, usually Arshavin and Nasri, looked to cut in from the flanks, whilst a single striker played as a ‘false nine’, dropping deep.
Chamakh At Bordeaux
Chamakh actually has the attributes to play in 4-2-3-1, as he played the stiker’s role in this formation at Bordeaux. The team played two slightly deeper central midfielders, with attacking support from three forward midfielders. Their line-up against Bayern Munich in last season’s Champions League is a good example of Bordeaux’s system in action.
Jussie looked to cut in, whilst the two fullbacks went on the overlap, especially Chalme, rather like the system emplyed by Clichy and Sagna at Arsenal. Gourcuff played a more similar role to Mesut Ozil for Germany than Fabregas at Arsenal though.
Chamakh’s role for Bordeaux is clearly displayed in the heat map analysis from the Bayern Munich game. Chamakh dropped deep and wide, in the style that Wenger has utilised strikers for Arsenal since Henry.
Van Persie and Bendtner play in a similar style, evidence that Wenger has signed a player who will fit into the current system. However, this may create selection problems for Arsene Wenger as Robin Van Persie has been first choice for that role for both Arsenal and World Cup finalists Holland. Playing a single striker would mean a choice between the two.
Selection Issues?
Of course Van Persie has struggled with long term injuries almost every season he has been at Arsenal. In effect the signing of Chamakh would just allow another top quality option to lead the line, as Bendtner is still developing, and Eduardo demonstrated last season that playing the lone striker is not his best role.
This would solve the dilemma and allow Wenger to rotate the team, and this may well happen. The team has been in desperate need of extra depth, and Chamakh is an experienced player with his best years ahead of him, and his heading ability adds another dimension to Arsenal’s play.
However, if Arsene Wenger wanted to play both Chamakh and Van Persie Arsenal might see a slight change of system. It has been suggested that the team could play a 4-4-2, but Arsenal have already switched away from the 4-4-2, and the development of formations suggests that the 4-4-2 can no longer always be effective. The 4-2-3-1 allows players to play between the lines, and as demonstrated at the World Cup in South Africa the more fluid sides dominated, with both finalists, Spain and Holland lining up with four zone formations.
In this formation Chamakh could partner Van Persie who would drop deep in the hole. The problem here is congestion in the centre of the field, as both Arsenal wingers look to cut inside, and Fabregas plays best pushing forward. Having Chamakh playing up front in addition means the team could lack balance.
In another case Chamakh or Van Persie could play on the left or right respectively, but considering the depth of support for those positions, and the qualities of the two strikers it seems that they will be used up front.
Conclusion
The last few seasons have shown that in reality Arsenal have almost never had a full strength squad, and so many players have had to provide cover in different positions. This epidemic of injuries means that for me Chamakh will slot in as the lone striker to cover Robin Van Persie.
Not only this but even without injury, the large amount of games that the team plays means that the strikers could play 30 games apiece playing as single strikers in a squad rotation system.
When looked at through the lens of the recent past, there shouldn’t be a selection dilemma, due to the fact that injuries have been so prevalent. If anything Wenger is simply strengthening the side and adding a quality option up front. This should see Arsenal retain their fluid 4-2-3-1 system in the coming season, interchanging Van Persie, Chamakh and Bendtner.
Nicklas Bendtner is well known for his self confidence in the Premier League, and has been subject to criticism in the past over his performances. Without a doubt he is a talented player, however he may not be the superstar that he and his father bill him to be.
Nevertheless Nicklas did come up with several important goals during 2009-10 and often had to lead the line on his own for Arsenal, a tough task considering his age.
Denmark used Bendtner as their main striker in the World Cup in South Africa, their preferred formation was 4-2-3-1, meaning he was the solitary front man, a tough task for any young player. Indeed, he didn’t manage to pull them through in the final group game where they lost 3-1 to Japan and missed out on the Second Round.
Denmark First Half 4-2-3-1
That game was won through Japan’s hard work and efficiency with the ball, playing an ultimately defensive game, but getting forward well when they had the chance.
In contrast Denmark looked a little lost after conceding the first goal, and never really got organised. Bendtner failed to impose himself on the game, something noted by many commentators.
Bendtner had scored the opening goal in their previous game in Cameroon, but the main feature of his play for Denmark in the Japan game was his lack of movement, and low work rate, especially in the second half, when the Danes switched to play three strikers up front in a very narrow formation.
Denmark Second Half 4-3-3
The Danish front line waited for high balls into the box from the wings, and though it might seem that Bendtner’s height would allow him a huge advantage over the centre backs Tanaka and Nakazawa it really didn’t. They frequently won headers, and beat Nicklas to the ball.
Another theme was Bendtner dropping deep between the lines to pick up the ball, in the ‘false nine’ style, which Robin Van Persie perfected over the previous two seasons. This did create good passages of play for Denmark in the first half, but as the Japanese played very deep there was no room for the Danish wingers to look for the diagonal pass, or run into space that Bendtner created.
The interchange between the Danish frontline had improved against Cameroon, after Bendtner looked isolated against the Netherlands where the Danes lost 2-0. However the forward three became isolated again in the second half against Japan.
One of the main issues of the game was the lower workrate of the players, Bendtner actually covered very little ground compared to others. He ran 8900m compared to the opposing centre forward Honda who covered over 11000m.
This was a pattern repeated over each match of the group stage, vs Netherlands, Cameroon, and finally Japan.
The end product was lacking from Denmark and Bendtner which is a real contrast in comparison with the match against Cameroon. The deep Japanese defence, and pressing midfield really created problems, and Nicklas obviously struggled with the lack of space available to him.
The same problems have been apparent in the Premier League for Arsenal, Bendtner doesn’t have the best first touch in the Arsenal squad, and so sometimes in tight spaces he struggled.
However, it is clear that Bendtner has talent, and with more experience he will become a very useful striker, this one game was tough for him, but don’t forget about moments like his well taken goal at the Nou Camp last season. He has led the line on his own for both Arsenal and Denmark this season, and for such a young player the experience can only benefit him in the long run.
The latest tactical comment on the World Cup, in our joint analysis with Talking About Football. This time we look at Germany’s system. A young and exciting team, who lack experience, something which sounds more than a little like Arsenal.
Low plays a 4-2-3-1 system, and like to get the full backs forward in attack. Pressing is the name of the day, and the team will look to counter-attack rapidly through their forward players.
If you are interested in tactics then it’s well worth a read.
Read more articles in the build up to the World Cup on Talking about Football
The Economic Vindication of Arsene Wenger
Arsene Wenger has had a tough time in front of the media over the last few years. Arsenal are still playing the high class, crisp passing game everyone loves (or loves to hate), but silverware has not been forthcoming. Recently the economic figures have been released, revealing that Arsenal’s turnover is exceeding Premier League records, and this in itself can be seen as a step forward.
However, the harshest critics are those who completely lack perspective. The easiest way to visualise the project that Arsene Wenger and the back-room staff at Arsenal have been working on is to split it into three stages. The first stage was the moulding of the club in Arsene’s image, and the transformation of Arsenal from a good team into a successful, world class team. This was completed, with many years of silverware, and high achievements.
The Second Stage
From this point the club then required the second stage of development. This stage involved turning Arsenal into an economic powerhouse, to parallel the achievements on the football field, and maintain sustainable success for the long term.
This second stage began in 2002 with the re-branding of the club, a new logo, and the plans to build Ashburton Grove, or the Emirates. Stage two is arguably the most difficult transition for any club to undergo. There is the financial risk surrounding debt accumulation, and the requirement that success be maintained on the field.
This transition was meticulously planned, and the nature of the sustainable growth meant that the squad development would rely more on nurturing talent rather than buying in an overinflated transfer market. Moving to a new stadium is hard for many clubs, most suffering loss of form, relegations, debts, just look at Valencia or teams such as Leicester, or even the calamitous Wembley project.
Instead of this, Arsenal have maintained a Champions League place, albeit precariously at times, over all the years of hardship, and have managed to mount title challenges in 07/08 and 09/10. Not only this but the team have reached the Champions League Final, Semi final, and Quarter finals twice, our best ever record in Europe. I will accept the arguement that players like Cesc agitating for a move could be partially a result of this transition, but how else should the club be grown? There are of course other ways of analysing the economics too.
This record may not equal silverware, but put in perspective it is an impressive achievement. Now the success is off the pitch. Arsenal capitalised on their boom years, and now play in arguably the best equipped stadium in Britain.
To top this off Arsenal’s debt is being paid off very fast, over £100 million out of roughly £350 million went in early 2010. The recent figures though are the greatest vindication of the project that is two thirds into completion. Arsenal now have a turnover of £316 million, a Premier League record, and certain qnly one of the worlds largest. Debt is not only being paid off quickly, but is sustainable, and is only 8% of the Premier League total, Man Utd and Liverpool combined represent almost 40%.
In addition wages are held at an astounding low of 32% of turnover, which is unheard of in the Premier League.
This is the second stage of Arsenal’s transformation well into completion. The club is turning into an economic powerhouse, whilst maintaining consistent (although a little unsatisfactory) performance on the pitch as a price for the painful transition. Once stage two is complete, the third and final stage is to then accelerate the club’s performance without the hindrance of debts. Arsenal can then move up a gear as one of the world’s richest, but also most sustainable clubs, with success on the football field increasing.
The three stages see Arsenal move from successful, to rich, and then to becoming very successful sustainably.
Outside Influences
Do not forget that the most difficult second phase has also come at a time when foreign investors have been loitering, in a time when clubs like Man Utd and Liverpool are saddled with debt, the strains of which finally showed this season. This type of ownership has also seen teams such as Chelsea and Man City over inflate the transfer market and create extra competition at the top of the Premier League.
Meanwhile Arsenal have been quietly building on a fantastic model, which will deliver the goods in the long term. Take a team like Liverpool, they have had arguably more success than Arsenal since 2005 – winning the Champions League in 2005 and the FA Cup 2006, compared to our FA Cup (2005), and finishing higher in the league on several occasions. The difference is, that although Liverpool have achieved a greater triumph than Arsenal ever in the Champions League, they are now mired in debt, with little money for new players, possible mass exodus mooted, no new stadium built as promised, a disappointing year in the League and Champions League, and now finishing 7th.
Arsenal may not have had hands on the Champions League trophy yet, but the club is arguably in a much better position to go on and challenge for it once again, and each year Arsenal do so they do it with improved finances, and improved young talent. Don’t forget that the new Premier League rulings on home grown players may also work to our advantage regarding youth players.
The most crucial step now is making sure that key players can keep the faith, specifically I mean Fabregas. If Cesc leaves then he is replaceable, but the blow will be massive. Never before has Wenger lost quite such a talent in his prime. The team needs to be united, and requires continuity to progress into a new era where Arsenal can dominate in competition and economically. The situation is improving year by year, but there is always pressure to balance this with results, and specifically silverware.
Interested in team tactics at the World Cup? Read up on Uruguay’s 3-4-1-2 here.
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